





































Evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes relative to expecta-
tions. I analyze this expectation-based loss aversion [Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006, 2009)] in the context of dynamic and static auctions, where the ref-
erence point is given by the (endogenous) equilibrium outcome. If agents
update their reference point during the auction, the arrival of informa-
tion crucially affects equilibrium behavior. Consequently, I show that—
even with independent private values—the Vickrey auction yields strictly
higher revenue than the English auction, violating the well known revenue
equivalence. Thus, dynamic loss aversion offers a novel explanation for
empirically observed differences between these auction formats.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are a universal tool to organize sales in markets. At the core of auction
theory stand the well known revenue equivalence results. Vickrey (1961) notes the
strategic equivalence between the dynamic English and the static Vickrey auction:
if values are independent and private, there is no effect of sequential information
and it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid (up to) one’s private valuation in both
formats.1 These powerful theoretical predictions, however, stand in contrast to
the experimental literature, which mostly finds lower revenues for the English
auction.2 I identify endogenous preferences in the form of expectation-based loss
aversion as a possible explanation for this phenomenon.
In my model, bidders evaluate any auction outcome relative to their reference
point, formed by rational expectations. Consequently, it is no longer optimal in
neither the second-price (Vickrey), nor in the ascending-clock (English) auction
to bid (up to) one’s intrinsic valuation. Concretely, loss aversion leads to strong
overbidding for high types in the Vickrey auction. Moreover, if an agent updates
her reference point based on new information, opponents’ behavior influences
the agent’s reference point, and thus her endogenous preferences. Hence, even
if valuations for the object are entirely private, sequential information revelation
affects bidding behavior. Consequently, the English and the Vickrey auction are
no longer strategically equivalent. I demonstrate that, consistent with most of the
experimental evidence, the English auction yields a lower revenue. I establish that
this effect is driven by a time-inconsistency problem, which dynamic expectation-
based loss-averse bidders face when forming their bidding strategy.
Following the concept of loss aversion by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2009), I
assume that, in addition to classical utility, bidders experience gain-loss utility
from comparing the outcome to their expectations. Further, I assume that bidders
bracket narrowly, meaning that they assign gains and losses separately to the
money dimension and the good dimension. For the ease of exposition, the main
part of this paper considers bidders who are exclusively loss averse with respect
to the object.3 If they win the auction, they experience a feeling of elation,
proportional to how unexpected it was for them to win. Similarly, they perceive
1Myerson (1981) extends the results to show that all main auction formats give rise to the
same expected revenue.
2For a summary of the experimental literature, see Kagel (1995).
3I show in section 7.1 that the main insights generalize to cases where bidders assign gains
and losses separately to the money and good dimension.
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a feeling of loss if they lose, proportional to their expectation of winning. Taking
that into account, bidders will overbid their intrinsic valuation. Since losses with
respect to expectations are weighted stronger than gains, high types—who expect
to win more often—overbid more aggressively than low types in the symmetric
equilibrium of the Vickrey auction.
To model the impact of dynamic information on an agent’s reference point
in the dynamic English auction, I take the continuous-time limit of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009): at each clock increment bidders observe whether opponents drop
out of the auction. This information permanently updates bidders’ expectations
about winning the auction and about how much they have to pay. If the changes
in beliefs immediately update the bidders’ reference points, they instantaneously
perceive gain-loss utility, which means that they assign gains and losses to changes
in the reference distribution.
I consider the two most extreme cases as benchmarks: if the reference-point
updating lags sufficiently behind changes in beliefs, there is no updating during
the auction process and therefore no impact of sequential information. In that
case, the English auction remains equivalent to the Vickrey auction. If the new
information immediately updates the reference point, however, bidders’ utility
depends on the observed signals about opponents’ bidding strategies during the
auction process, even though values are private.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin interpret an agent’s reference point as her lagged beliefs.
Recent experimental findings, however, suggest that the reference point adjusts
quickly to new information. Whether instantaneous reference-point updating is
a realistic approximation may depend on the exact auction environment, e.g. the
speed at which the price augments, which can differ immensely across different
English auctions. In any case, it is clear that instantaneous updating constitutes
a natural and important benchmark.
Since losses are weighted more strongly than gains, expected gain-loss utility
is always negative. Consequently, bidders dislike fluctuation in beliefs. As bid-
ders are forward looking, they will account for these costs when they form their
bidding strategy. In principle, an aggressive bid would to some extent insure
against belief fluctuations during the auction process. However, if the auction
goes on and opponents prevail, bidders’ belief to win the auction eventually de-
clines. Bidders become less attached to the auctioned object, and, at the point at
which they would have to bid aggressively, it becomes time inconsistent to do so.
They eventually perceive themselves as a low type with respect to the remaining
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bidders. This leads to only moderate overbidding - mirroring low types in the
Vickrey auction. Therefore, bidding is less aggressive in an English auction with
reference point updating.
Since bidders dislike belief fluctuations, they would prefer not to observe the
auction process and would rather use proxies to bid on their behalf. This logic
is related to Benartzi et al. (1995) and Pagel (2016), who explain the equity
premium puzzle using loss aversion: since stock prices fluctuate, an investor who
regularly checks her portfolio will experience negative expected gain-loss utility.
This disutility makes stocks less attractive relative to bonds.
Lange and Ratan (2010) highlight that in the presence of loss aversion in
hedonic dimensions most laboratory results may not be transferable to the field:
the effects of loss aversion are mainly driven by the assumption that bidders
account losses and gains separately in the money and the good dimension (narrow
bracketing). In order to control for private values, most auction experiments,
however, use auction tokens, which can be interchanged for money at the end of
the experiment. In context of these induced value experiments, bidders might not
assign gains and losses separately to tokens and money, as they are in fact both
money.4 Since I assume narrow bracketing throughout this paper, my results are
more likely to apply to real commodity auctions, rather than to experiments on
induced value auctions. Therefore, my results can only explain the revenue gap
between Vickrey auctions and English auctions in the experimental literature on
induced values if we assume that bidders don’t perceive the tokens as money.
Recent experiments find support for expectation-based loss aversion in auc-
tions.5 There is surprisingly little experimental literature that compares revenues
of real commodity English auctions and Vickrey auctions.6 The only laboratory-
controlled experiment that I am aware of, is conducted by Schindler (2003). She
reports 14 percent lower revenues in English auctions, therefore confirming the
findings of the induced-value literature as well as my theoretical predictions.
The contribution of my paper is twofold. First, it provides a novel rationale
to explain the observed revenue gap between the two auction formats. Second,
4Indeed, Shogren et al. (1994) run Vickrey auctions to sell different goods and show that an
endowment effect is strongest for non-market goods with imperfect substitutes.
5See Banerji and Gupta (2014), Rosato and Tymula (2016), and the discussion in the Lit-
erature Section.
6The only field experiment I am aware of is conducted by Lucking-Reiley (1999), who trades
collectable cards on an internet auction platform. He finds no significant difference in revenues,
though he admits himself that he cannot entirely control for a potential selection bias and
endogenous entry.
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it contributes to the small body of literature on strategic interaction between
loss-averse agents. To my best knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze such
interaction in a dynamic game with more than two periods.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the
related literature, Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 analyzes equilibrium
behavior in the Vickrey auction, while Section 5 analyzes equilibrium behavior in
the English auction with two loss-averse bidders. Section 6 discusses the revenue
comparison of both auction formats. Section 7 analyzes several extensions, while
Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Kahneman et al. (1990) establish the endowment effect : the robust empirical
observation that agents’ valuation for goods increase with ownership. It has
since been experimentally replicated under many different circumstances, for
summaries see Camerer (1995) and Horowitz and McConnell (2002). Tversky
and Kahneman (1991) propose loss aversion with respect to the status quo to
explain the endowment effect.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) suggest recent rational expectations as reference
point. The hypothesis that expectations play a role in individual’s preferences
have been supported in recent experiments (Ericson and Fuster (2011) and Abeler
et al. (2011)), as well as challenged (Heffetz and List (2014)).7 In the context
of auctions, Banerji and Gupta (2014) and Rosato and Tymula (2016) provide
evidence that expectation-based loss aversion affects bidding behavior. Banerji
and Gupta (2014) manipulate rational expectations by changing the support of
the opponents’ draw in a BDM auction, whereas Rosato and Tymula (2016)
vary the number of bidders in a Vickrey auction between treatments. Both
experiments find that bids significantly increase in the induced expectations to
win, as predicted by the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
The idea that the reference point is determined by recent beliefs leads to the
natural question of the speed of reference-point adjustment. Strahilevitz and
Loewenstein (1998) provide early evidence that the time span for which individu-
als hold beliefs has an impact on the reference point. Gill and Prowse (2012) use
a real effort task to measure loss aversion and find that in their framework “the
7For a literature revue on related evidence, see Ericson and Fuster (2014).
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adjustment process is essentially instantaneous”. Smith (2012) induces different
probabilities of winning an item across groups of individuals. After the uncer-
tainty resolves, he measures the willingness to pay for the item among bidders
who have not won. In contrast to Ericson and Fuster (2011), who elicit valuations
before the uncertainty resolves, Smith finds no significant difference between dif-
ferent groups, which suggests that the reference point is not so much determined
by lagged beliefs, but rather adjusts quickly to the new information.8
For static environments Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) has arguably become the
standard model of reference-dependent preferences, and been successfully ap-
plied to various fields, like mechanism design (Eisenhuth (2018)), contract theory
(Herweg et al. (2010)), industrial organization (for instance Heidhues and Ko˝szegi
(2008), Herweg and Mierendorff (2013), Karle and Peitz (2014), Rosato (2016)),
and labor markets (Eliaz and Spiegler (2014)). Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2014)
show that buyers in monopolistic markets may face a similar form of time incon-
sistency as I establish for bidders in the English auction: ex ante they would like
to commit not to buy. If the seller induces low prices with some probability, this
plan, however, is time inconsistent. As a result, the consumer ends up buying for
a high prices as well.
There is a small, but growing, body of literature concerning strategic in-
teraction between multiple loss-averse players. Dato et al. (2017) extend the
equilibrium concepts of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) to strategic interaction. Mer-
mer (2017) analyzes contests with loss-averse agents. Similar to my results in
the Vickrey auction, she finds that the willingness to invest is increasing in the
winning probability.
In the context of auctions, Lange and Ratan (2010) point out that loss-averse
bidders may behave differently in laboratory experiments than in the field; bidders
may not bracket narrowly in induced-value experiments. Further, they calculate
the equilibrium bidding function of loss averse bidders in the first-price auction
and Vickrey auction for a different equilibrium concept than I use in this paper.
(For a more detailed discussion of the equilibrium concepts see Section 4.)
Ehrhart and Ott (2014) introduce a model of the Dutch and English auction,
where sequential information updates the reference point, but—in contrast to
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009)—does not induce gain-loss utility. As a result, in
equilibrium there is never any feeling of loss in the English auction, since by the
8Smith’s confidence intervals are, however, rather wide.
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time a bidder drops out she expects to lose. Eisenhuth and Grunewald (2018)
show that the all-pay auction yields higher payoffs than the first-price auction for
narrow-bracketing bidders, since loss-averse bidders dislike payment uncertainty.
For dynamic environments Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) propose a model of
dynamic loss aversion, where updates of expectations carry reference-dependent
utility. This model has so far only been applied sparsely. First applications
nevertheless seem promising. Rosato (2014) uses a two-period dynamic model to
show that revenues are decreasing in sequential auctions with loss-averse bidders,
due to a discouragement effect. Macera (2018) shows for a two-period moral
hazard model with loss-averse agents that for the optimal contract wages are
fixed and incentives are deferred into the future. To my best knowledge, Pagel is
the first to rigorously apply Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) to dynamic problems with
a longer time horizon. Pagel (2016) shows that dynamic reference-dependent
preferences can explain the historical levels of equity premiums and premium
volatility in asset prices. Related to the logic in the English auction, loss-averse
agents dislike price fluctuations, which makes assets relatively unattractive. Pagel
(2017) shows that dynamic reference-dependent preferences can explain empirical
observations about saving schemes for life-cycle consumption.
To my best knowledge, my model is the first to analyze strategic interaction
of loss-averse players in a dynamic game with more than two periods.
3 The Model
3.1 Auction Rules
There are n loss-averse bidders participating in an auction for a non-divisible
good. Bidder i’s intrinsic valuation θi is privately observed and independently
drawn from a common distribution
θi ∼ G,
where G has a strictly positive, differentiable density g on support [θmin, θmax],
with 0 ≤ θmin < θmax.
For the Vickrey (second-price) auction, every bidder submits a sealed bid after
learning her private valuation. Then the auction is resolved: the bidder with the
highest bid receives the object and has to pay the amount of the second-highest
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bid.
For the English auction, I am considering a format sometimes referred to as
the “Ascending Clock Auction” or the “Japanese Auction”. Bidding starts at a
fixed price and is raised incrementally by the auctioneer each time period. Each
bidder signals—for example by raising or dropping her hand—when she wishes
to drop out of the auction. Once a bidder dropped out she cannot bid again.
The auction ends if there is only one active bidder left. This bidder has to pay
the price at which the last of her opponents dropped out.
For simplicity, I assume that there is no reservation price in either auction.
3.2 Preferences
I follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) in how to model dynamic loss aversion: given
their own bidding strategy, agents hold rational beliefs about winning the auction
and the respective transfers made after the auction. These beliefs determine their
initial reference point. For most of the exposition, I assume that bidders update
their reference point instantaneously when they update their beliefs with respect
to new information. In the Vickrey auction, the only information update takes
place when the auction is resolved and the bidder learns whether she won and at
which price. In contrast, in the English auction a bidder observes each period,
whether any opponents drop out, and thus receives an information signal about
the final outcome.
Let us denote by F kt a bidder’s rational beliefs over final payoffs in k ∈
{money, good}, as anticipated at time t. When information revelation at any
time t updates the reference point with respect to the auction outcome from
F kt−1 to F
k
t , the bidder experiences feelings of gains or losses. This psychological
utility, called gain-loss utility, is denoted by N(F kt |F kt−1). We assume throughout
the paper that bidders are bracketing narrowly: they perceive gain-loss utility
additively separated with respect to belief changes in money and good.
For the evaluation of gain-loss utility, bidders assign gains and losses to
changes in the respective quantiles of the distribution function. Intuitively, they
rank possible outcomes from worst to best and then evaluate changes to the
worst, the second worst ,..., until the best outcome. Let us denote with cFkt the
quantile function of F kt , which is mathematically the left-continuous inverse of
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F kt . Then




where the function µk measures feelings of gain and loss for respective belief
changes. As a key feature, loss-averse bidders weight losses with respect to their
reference distribution stronger than gains. Following Section IV in Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006) and most of the literature, I take µk to be piecewise linear,
µk(y) =
ηky y ≥ 0,λkηky y < 0,
where ηk > 0, λk > 1. Moreover, I assume Λk := λkηk − ηk < 1 for k ∈ {m, g}.9
The total utility from the auction is given by the classical utility from trade
if the auction is won, and the accumulated gain-loss utility during the auction
process. Suppose the English auction runs for at most T increments. For a fixed
bidding strategy and induced initial beliefs Fm0 and F
g






N(Fmt |Fmt−1) +N(F gt |F gt−1)
)
+ (θi − x),
if bidder i wins the auction at a price of x.10 In this case, the distribution FmT has
unit mass on −x, whereas F gT has unit mass on θ. If bidder i loses the auction





N(Fmt |Fmt−1) +N(F gt |F gt−1)
)
,
where FmT and F
g
T both have unit mass on zero.
In contrast, in the Vickrey auction there is no updating before the auction is
resolved. For the same fixed bidding strategy and initial belief as in the English
auction, gain-loss utility consists only of the update from F k0 to the auction
9The condition Λ < 1 is referred to as “no dominance of gain-loss utility” by Herweg et al.
(2010) It ensures that the dislike for uncertainty isn’t too strong. If Λ > 1 a bidder could
potentially prefer a strictly dominated safe outcome to a lottery.
10The upper bound of T in the sum is without loss of generality; if the auction terminates
early, all subsequent periods can be regarded as uninformative, and carry no further reference-
dependent utility.
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outcome F kT . Consequently, total utility is given by
ui = N(F
m
T |Fm0 ) +N(F gT |F g0 )
)
+ (θi − x),
if the auction is won, and
ui = N(F
m




Before I define the appropriate equilibrium concept and derive optimal bidding
strategies, the following example illustrates how gain-loss utility is formed during
the auction process. It shows why loss-averse bidders prefer a Vickrey auction to
an English auction—taken behavior of opponents as given.
Example 1. Consider an auction with two bidders. Bidder 1 (called the bidder)
has a valuation of θ for the object. Suppose the bidder plans to drop out at a price
of 8 and believes that the drop-out price of her opponent is ex ante uniformly
distributed on [0, 10] (we do not consider here, under which circumstances this
behavior would be optimal). Ex ante, the bidder has a probability of 0.8 to win
the auction and to have a payoff of θ in the good dimension. Thus, the ex ante
quantile function for the good dimension is given by
cF g0 (p) =
0 p ≤ 0.2,θ p > 0.2.
Let us first consider the English auction. With every increase of the clock
price, the bidder updates her beliefs in a Bayesian way. For each increment
where her opponent does not drop out, her belief to win the auction decreases. If
we use for the distribution subscript the current clock price rather than the time
period, the updated quantile function in the good dimension for a clock price of
y is given by
cF gy (p) =
0 p ≤ 210−y ,θ p > 2
10−y .
Suppose the opponent drops out at a price of 6. Figure 1 shows the quantile
functions before the auction begins (dotted), at a clock price of 4 (dashed), an
arbitrary small increment before 6 (solid), and after the drop out at 6 (solid
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constant function).
Figure 1: Updating in the English Auction
At a price of 4 the bidder’s belief to lose has already increased from 0.2 to
1/3. The medium grey shaded area is proportional to the loss the bidder has
accumulated up to the price of 4 as the integrated difference between the initial
and current quantile function. Just before the opponent drops out at 6, the
bidder’s belief to lose has further increase to almost 0.5. The light shaded area
shows the additional loss just before a price of 6 is announced. The losses are
weighted with a factor of λη.
The moment the price increases to 6, the opponent drops out and the bid-
der wins with certainty. The quantile function jumps to the constant function
cF g6 = θ, inducing a feeling of gain of η times the three combined shaded areas.
Thus, the net gain-loss utility in the good dimension for the English auction is
(0.2η + 0.3(η − λη))θ = (0.2η − 0.3Λ)θ.
We now compare this gain-loss utility to the one from a Vickrey auction with
the same valuation and the same bidding strategies. While the ex-ante belief is
identically given by cF g0 , the only update takes place after the auction is resolved,
and the belief jumps to the constant quantile function cF g6 . Thus, total gain-loss
utility is given by 0.2ηθ, hence proportional to only the dark grey area.
Intuitively, since losses are weighted stronger than gains, the fluctuation of
beliefs in the English auction generates a net loss of −0.3Λθ compared to the
Vickrey auction. If the bidder could use a bidding proxy that enabled her to
ignore new information in the English auction until the auction was over, she
would forgo this unpleasant variation in beliefs, and receive the same utility as in
a Vickrey auction. This logic is due to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), who formally
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show in their Proposition 1 that, ceteris paribus, any collapse of information
signals weakly increases agents’ utility. The result that bidders in the English
auction would prefer proxies to bid on their behalf is a testable prediction.
The updating with respect to money is a bit more complex than the updating
in the good dimension: if an opponent does not drop out at some price, the
probability of losing and paying nothing increases as well as the probability of
paying a high price. Nevertheless the same intuition applies: fluctuations in
beliefs are costly, and loss-averse bidders would prefer to get all information at
once. The following Corollary summarizes the findings of the example. Formally,
it is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1 in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009).
Corollary 1. Loss-averse agents would prefer the use of proxies to bid on their
behalf in the English auction. For a given set of bidders’ maximal bids, any
loss-averse bidder receives weakly higher utility in a Vickrey auction than in an
English auction.
3.3 Strategies and Equilibrium Concept
I apply the equilibrium concept of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) to the auction
framework. For full details and a psychological justification of the specific dy-
namic modeling choices, I refer to their paper.
Definition 1. A bidding plan b specifies an available action for every point in
time and every possible history of information revelation. A bidding strategy
b(θ) assigns to each possible type θ a bidding plan.
Consequently, in the English auction a bidding plan is a history-contingent
plan for each increment to either remain or drop out, depending on the opponent
drop-out history at that time. Note that for a two-bidder English auction such
a plan can be described by a maximum bid b ∈ R+ up to which a bidder will
decide to remain.11 This is very similar to the Vickrey auction, where a bidding
plan simply prescribes a sealed bid b ∈ R+ at the beginning of the auction.
I take the interim approach in the sense that first each bidder learns her
valuation θ, and forms a bidding plan b(θ). Then, rational beliefs H0 about the
opponents’ bidding plans define the bidder’s initial reference point over payoffs
as functions F k0 ≡ F k0 (b, θ,H0). Then, the auction takes place.
11I relegate the more general formal description of a bidding plan in the English auction to
Section 7.3, where I analyze the English auction for more than two bidders.
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The Vickrey auction
To capture the static character of the Vickrey action, I assume there is no refer-
ence point updating until the auction is resolved. To keep notational similarity
with the English auction, denote for a given maximal opponent bid x with F kT (b, θ)
final payoffs from a bid b. Then, if a bidder forms the bidding plan to bid b∗ but




N(F kT (b, θ)|F k0 (b∗, θ,H0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain-loss utility




In the English auction, a bidder not only updates the reference point with respect
to new information at each increment, but also faces the opportunity to deviate
to another bidding plan.
• At each period t, before the clock increases, each bidder may change from
her bidding plan b∗ to another plan b for the remaining of the auction. Such
a deviation instantaneously changes rational beliefs about final payoffs. The
belief change instantaneously induces a reference point update with gain-
loss utility N(F kt (b, θ,Ht)|F kt (b∗, θ,Ht)) in both commodity dimensions.
• At each price increment between t and t+ 1 each bidder observes whether
opponents drop out. Given a bidder’s plan b, the respective update in their
belief and their reference point instantaneously induces gain-loss utility
N(F kt+1(b, θ,Ht+1)|F kt (b, θ,Ht)) for both commodity dimensions.
After the auction is terminated, transfers are made according to the auction
rules.12







N(F ks (b, θ,Hs)|F ks−1(b, θ,Hs−1))
)
(2)
12For mathematical convenience, I abstract from tie breaking rules and assume that the
good is not sold, if the remaining bidders drop out simultaneously. With our assumption of
continuous density of types, as we let the increment size go to zero, this becomes equivalent to
a tie breaking rule by coin-flip.
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total gain-loss utility induced by plan b from time t onwards. Then total utility
ut(b, θ|b∗) from time t onwards if a bidder deviates at time t from plan b∗ to plan
b is given by
ut(b, θ|b∗) = uc +
∑
k∈{money,good}
N(F kt (b, θ,Ht)|F kt (b∗, θ,Ht)) + lt(b, θ,Ht), (3)
where uc is classical utility θ − x if the auction is won at some price x and
zero otherwise.
We are ready to define the equilibrium concept used in both auction formats.
Intuitively, a bidding plan constitutes a personal equilibrium if, given the refer-
ence point resulting from the plan, it maximizes expected utility at any point in
time among all credible plans. In the following we denote with
Ut(b, θ|b∗) ≡ EHtut(b, θ|b∗) (4)
and
Lt(b, θ|b∗) ≡ EHtlt(b, θ|b∗) (5)
the respective expected utilities at time t.
Definition 2. A bidding plan b∗ constitutes a personal equilibrium (PE) for
a bidder of type θ, if — given rational expectations derived from the plan — at
all times t and all possible information revelations
Ut(b
∗, θ|b∗) ≥ Ut(b, θ|b∗), (6)
for all credible bidding plans b that the bidder wants to carry through. A personal
equilibrium is a preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) if it maximizes utility
at time zero among all personal equilibria.
In practice, the set of credible plans for a given belief must be determined
by thinking backwards. Crucially, the equilibrium concept implies that bidders
don’t have commitment power towards their future selfs in the sense that they
cannot commit to bidding plans that they don’t want to carry through at the
time of actions. As we will see, committing to such unfavorable actions could be
profitable, because it would alter beliefs, and therefore change gain-loss utility
received during the auction.
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The set of personal equilibria depends on the belief about other players’ ac-
tions. To analyze the strategic interaction between multiple bidders, we focus on
symmetric personal equilibria.
Definition 3. A bidding strategy strategy b(θ) constitutes a (preferred) sym-
metric equilibrium if for each type θ and the belief that all opponents bid ac-
cording to strategy b(θ), the bidding plan b(θ) constitutes a (preferred) personal
equilibrium.
4 The Vickrey Auction
In the Vickrey auction, the only decision is made at t = 0 where each bidder
submits a bid b∗ ∈ R+. By Definition 2, such a bid is a personal equilibrium if
U0(b
∗, θ|b∗) ≥ U0(b, θ|b∗)
for all b ∈ R+. This definition of a personal equilibrium for the special case of
a single individual decision under uncertainty exactly coincides with the definition
of an unacclimating personal equilibrium (UPE) in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), as I
show in the Appendix. It contrasts their concept of a choice-acclimating personal
equilibrium (CPE), which requires
U0(b
∗, θ|b∗) ≥ U0(b, θ|b)
for all b ∈ R+. Thus, in contrast to the UPE-bidder, a CPE-bidder—which
is analyzed in Lange and Ratan (2010)—already internalizes the effects of her
deviation on the reference point. While both concepts are frequently used in the
literature, I focus on the UPE as a special case of the dynamic PE, in order to
draw a clear comparison between the Vickrey auction and the English auction,
and isolate the effect of dynamic information revelation. Moreover, it seems that
a Vickrey auction, where bidders may form beliefs and bidding plans long before
the auction starts, is a situation in which a bidder “anticipates the decision
she faces but cannot commit to a choice until shortly before the outcome” as
suggested for a UPE by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007).
Because it suffices for demonstrating the novel economic effect of information
revelation and allows for a significantly simpler exposition, I first focus on the
case in which bidders are loss averse in the good dimension only, i.e. ηm = 0. In
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Section 7.1 I show that my results generalize to the case where we allow for loss
aversion in the money dimension as well.13
Rational beliefs about winning the auction and the respective price are de-
termined by the distribution over the maximal opponent bid. Fixing a bidder of
type θ, we let H(b) be the distribution over the maximal opponent bid. Since the
bidder receives a payoff of θ if and only if she wins the auction, the distribution
F g0 (b
∗, θ,H) has an atom of H(b∗) at θ and an atom of 1 − H(b∗) at zero. For
a given maximal opponent bid x, the gain-loss utility associated with bid b then
reads
N(F gT (b, θ)|F g0 (b∗, θ,H)) =
H(b∗)µ(−θ) b ≤ x,(1−H(b∗))µ(θ) b > x,
where the first line describes the feeling of loss if the agent loses the auction, and
the second line describes the feeling of gain if she wins. Using (4) and (1) we
obtain
U0(b, θ|b∗) = EH
(
H(b∗)µ(−θ)1x≥b + (1−H(b∗))µ(θ)1x<b + 1x<b(θ − x)
)











(θ − s)dH(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
classical utility
.
By definition bid b∗ is a personal equilibrium if it maximizes U0(b, θ|b∗) among
all bids b ∈ R+. In a symmetric equilibrium the rational belief H is determined by
the symmetric equilibrium bidding function. Thus, for any symmetric increasing
equilibrium bidding function b(θ) the distribution of the maximal opponent is
given by the first order statistic statistic of opponents’ types, i.e.
H(b(θ)) = Gn−1(θ).
Proposition 1. The unique symmetric increasing continuously differentiable PE
in the Vickrey auction with n bidders who are loss averse with respect to the good
13Horowitz and McConnell (2002) conclude in their summary that the endowment effect is
“highest for non-market goods, next highest for ordinary private goods, and lowest for exper-
iments involving forms of money”. In this sense it may be plausible that loss aversion mainly





1 + η(1−Gn−1(θ)) + ληGn−1(θ))θ.
Note that all types overbid with respect to their intrinsic valuation θ. This
should not be too surprising since we have assigned loss aversion only to the good
dimension, and therefore made the good relatively more important, compared to
money. More interestingly, the degree of overbidding is increasing in the type.
The lowest type moderately overbids by
b(θmin) = (1 + η)θmin,
while the highest type aggressively overbids by
b(θmax) = (1 + λη)θmax.
The reason is the so called attachment effect: high types believe to win. Not
winning would create a feeling of loss, which they try to prevent by placing an
aggressive bid. As we will see in Section 7.1, this intuition remains intact, if we
allow for loss aversion in money as well.
5 The English Auction for Two Bidders
I analyze the set of symmetric equilibria in the English auction with two bidders,
as the increment size goes to zero. Again, for ease of exposition, I first restrict
attention to loss aversion in the good dimension, and relegate the case of loss
aversion in both dimensions to Section 7.1 . In Section 7.3, I show that the main
insights generalize to the n bidder auction. While the history-dependent strategy
space in an n-bidder English auction is huge, it is fairly simple in a two-bidder
game. Given type θ, a bidding plan prescribes the price at which the bidder plans
to drop out, provided that the opponent is still active.
Each period the bidder observes whether her opponent remains in the auction.
This information permanently updates her reference point, which induces gain-
loss utility in each increment. An optimal bidding strategy will take the expected
gain-loss utility from news into account.
For calculating the ex-ante expected gain-loss utility, it is more convenient
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to work with distribution functions rather than with quantile functions. This
is possible, since they are generalized inverses of each other, and the integral
between functions equals the integral between their inverses up to the sign:
Lemma 1. Let F1 and F2 be distributions on some interval [a, b] and let cF1, cF2






With this result, one can look at the expected disutility from news.
Lemma 2. Suppose that a loss-averse agent’s payoff is distributed according to
F1 with probability ∆, and according to F2 with probability 1 − ∆. Let [a, b]
contain the supports of F1 and F2. Denote with F = ∆F1 + (1 − ∆)F2 the ex
ante distribution of payoffs. Then the ex ante expected reference-dependent utility
from learning, whether the distribution is F1 or F2, is given by




The intuition for the result is as follows: on average, there is “as much good
news as bad news”. If gains and losses were weighted equally, one would have
zero gain-loss utility in expectation. Since losses loom larger than gains, news
will generate negative utility in expectation where the amount of negative utility
is proportional to the expected variation and the loss dominance parameter Λ.
With this result we can calculate the accumulated expected loss due to gain-
loss utility, as the increment size goes to zero. In the following, it is convenient
to use the time subscript t for the current clock price rather than the number
of increments. Let us denote with F the distribution of the opponent’s drop-out
price, in the sense that an opponent with drop-out price y remains in the auction
at any clock price t < y, and drops out at prices t ≥ y.
Proposition 2. Consider a loss-averse bidder of type θ in the English auction
with one opponent and increments of ε. Let the opponent’s drop-out price be
distributed according to distribution F with density f . Suppose the bidder plans
to drop out at b, and the opponent hasn’t dropped out until price t < b. Then,
for ε going to zero, in the limit the ex ante expected marginal gain-loss utility at
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price t is given by
`t(b, θ, F ) =
−f(t)
(1− F (t))2 (1− F (b))Λθ.
Expected gain-loss utility for the remaining of the auction at time t is in the limit
given by







Note that the amount of marginal disutility from expected gain-loss utility
is decreasing in b: an aggressive strategy induces less belief fluctuation at each
information update, and thus partly insures against high gain-loss disutility in
each increment. There is, however, a countervailing effect on total gain-loss
disutility: the higher bidder’s drop-out price, the longer she may stay in the
auction and be exposed to gain-loss disutility. Figure 2 shows total expected gain-
loss disutility at the beginning of the auction for F ∼ U [0, 1]. We see that losses
are the strongest for intermediate bids, which induce the highest uncertainty.
Bidding 0 or 1 induces no uncertainty, and therefore no gain-loss utility.
In the following, we refer to the limit result as we let the increment size go to
zero as the continuous English auction.14
Figure 2: Total Expected Loss for F ∼ U [0, 1]
With Lt(b
∗, θ|b∗) we have established the expected gain-loss utility on equi-
14This notion does not intend to refer to the concept of continuous games by Simon and
Stinchcombe (1989). One should still regard the game as one with discrete increments on the
clock which are, however, arbitrarily small.
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librium path for an equilibrium strategy b∗. We now calculate the instantaneous
gain-loss utility that the bidder perceives, if she decides to deviate from strategy
b∗ to strategy b at some point in time:
Lemma 3. If at time t the bidder changes her strategy from dropping out at
b∗ ≥ t to dropping out at b ≥ t, this deviation induces an instantaneous gain-loss
utility of
N(Ft(b, θ, F )|Ft(b∗, θ, F )) = µ(F (b)− F (b
∗))
1− F (t) θ.
Summarizing Proposition 2 and Lemma 3 we obtain that for the continuous
English auction expected utility from time t onwards is given by
Ut(b, θ, F |b∗) =
∫ b
t
(θ − s)dF (s)
1− F (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
classical utility
+
µ(F (b)− F (b∗))
1− F (t) θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
one-time gain/loss
from deviating




All three terms change if a bidder deviates from b∗ to b at some time. Note that
the deviation utility is non-differentiable at b = b∗, since µ has a kink at zero.
Recall that a plan b∗ is a personal equilibrium if
b∗ = arg max
b
Ut(b, θ, F |b∗)
at all times t. In particular, bidding up to b∗ it must be optimal as t approaches
b∗. This leads to the following constraint on time consistent plans.
Lemma 4. Let the opponent’s drop-out price be distributed according to distri-
bution F with non-zero density f on some positive support [a, c]. Then, for the
continuous English auction any time consistent bidding strategy b ∈ (a, c) satisfies
b ≤ (1 + η)θ.
To understand the significance of this result, it is insightful to look at plans
the bidder would choose if she could commit to a bidding strategy before the
auction starts. She would not like to deviate from a strategy ex ante if and only
if
U0(b, θ, F |b∗) ≤ U0(b∗, θ, F |b∗)
for all b.
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Lemma 5. If two loss averse bidders could commit ex ante to a bidding strategy




1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ.
Figure 3 shows the ex ante optimal strategy (solid function) and the boundary
of time-consistent strategies (dashed line) for two loss averse bidders.
Figure 3: G(θ) ∼ U [0, 1], η = 0.3, λ = 4
We see that low types ex ante may wish to underbid, while high types wish
to strongly overbid. The intuition here is the same as in the Vickrey auction:
bidders want to reduce expected gain-loss utility, and therefore try to reduce the
uncertainty about winning. Moreover, high types would wish to insure with an
aggressive bid against belief fluctuations during the auction process.
However, it is time-inconsistent to bid above b = (1 + η)θ. Even though a
bidder with a high valuation would ex ante like to commit to an aggressive bid-
ding strategy, at the time she has to do so, she is not any more willing to carry
that action through: as the auction proceeds, the winning chances for the bidder
gradually decline. Thus, she gradually becomes a low type with respect to the
remaining auction, and therefore her initial strategy of overbidding becomes less
appealing. Just one increment before the bidder’s drop out, she perceives the re-
maining auction similarly as a Vickrey auction, where she has the lowest possible
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type. Hence, at that point in time, her optimal bidding strategy resembles that
of the lowest type in the Vickrey auction, i.e. she bids no more than b = (1+η)θ.
We have so far only considered constraints on equilibrium behavior at time 0
and at time b. It turns out that these are the binding constraints.
Lemma 6. Consider a loss-averse bidder of type θ in the continuous English
auction with one opponent. Let the opponent’s drop-out price be distributed ac-
cording to distribution F with non-zero density f on some positive support [a, c].
Then a strategy b∗ ∈ (a, c) is a PE if and only if
1. b∗ ≤ (1 + η)θ;
2. for any b ∈ [b∗, (1 + η)θ] we have U0(b∗, θ, F |b∗) ≥ U0(b, θ, F |b∗).
With this result we can now characterize the symmetric equilibria of the
English auction.
Proposition 3. An increasing, almost everywhere differentiable function b(θ) is
a symmetric equilibrium in the continuous English auction with two loss averse
bidders if and only if for all θ
1. b(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ;
2. b(θ) ≥ min{(1 + η)θ ; (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ }.
Thus, any increasing smooth function in the the gray shaded area of Figure
4 constitutes a symmetric equilibrium.
The thick line indicates the preferred symmetric equilibrium (PPE). Point
A, where the PPE hits the boundary of time consistent strategies can be easily
determined:
(1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ = (1 + η)θ
if and only if G(θ) = 1− 1/e ≈ 0.632.
Note that the PPE is tangent to (1 + η−Λ)θ at the lowest type. Hence there
is underbidding for low types if and only if η − Λ < 0, thus if and only if λ > 2.
Corollary 2. The symmetric PPE in the continuous English auction with two
loss averse bidders is given by
bPPE(θ) =
(1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ)))
)
θ G(θ) ≤ 1− 1/e,
(1 + η)θ G(θ) > 1− 1/e.
Low types underbid their intrinsic valuation θ in the PPE if and only if λ > 2.
22
Figure 4: G(θ) ∼ U [0, 1], η = 0.3, λ = 4
6 Revenue Comparison
The equilibrium bidding function of an English auction with loss-averse bidders
strongly depends on the question of how quickly new information is absorbed
into the reference point.
If the reference point consists of lagged beliefs, and the lag is sufficiently
high, new information during the auction process will have no impact on bidders’
reference point. If values are private, there is therefore no impact of information
gathered during the auction process. Each bidder will form her optimal decision
with respect to the initial belief, and thus faces the same objective function as
in the Vickrey auction—the strategic equivalence between English and Vickrey
auction remains.
If bidders, however, update their reference point dynamically with respect to
new information, loss-averse bidders bid at most (1 + η)θ.
The following figure shows the equilibrium bidding function for the Vickrey
auction, bVickrey(θ), and the PPE of the English auction with dynamic reference
point updating, bEnglish(θ). The shaded area indicates the potential other sym-
metric equilibria in the English auction, which are bounded by the line (1 + η)θ.
As we have seen in Section 4, overbidding with respect to θ is moderate for low
types and strong for high types in the Vickrey auction. We can see that bVickrey(θ)
at the lowest type is tangent to (1 + η)θ—the upper bound of equilibria in the
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Figure 5: G(θ) ∼ U [0, 1], η = 0.3, λ = 4
English auction. The intuition is that for low types the decision problem in
both auction formats becomes increasingly similar: since bidders in the English
auction only learn whether there are opponents with lower valuation than their
own, the information difference between the two auction formats at the time the
bidder places her (maximal) bid is small for low types.
Since the bidding function in the Vickrey auction satisfies bVickrey(θ) > (1+η)θ
for all types θ > θmin, it is immediate that the Vickrey auction dominates the
English auction with respect to revenue.
Proposition 4. 1. If bidders are loss averse and do not update their refer-
ence point during the auction process, the Vickrey auction and the English
auction are strategically equivalent: for a given continuous belief on the
maximal opponent bid, a bid b is a personal equilibrium in the Vickrey auc-
tion if and only if bidding up to b is a personal equilibrium in the English
auction.
2. If bidders are loss averse and update their reference point instantaneously
during the auction process, equilibrium bids of the lowest type may coincide
for both auction formats. For all other types, the Vickrey auction attains
strictly higher revenue than the English auction.
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7 Extensions and Robustness
7.1 Loss Aversion in the Money Dimensions
We generalize the baseline model to the case where bidders are loss averse in both
commodity dimensions—money and good.
The Vickrey Auction
Denote in short with Fb ≡ Fm0 (b, θ,H) the distribution of payments for a submit-
ted bid b given the continuous distribution of the highest opponent bid H. Since
with probability 1−H(b) a bidder loses and pays nothing, the distribution Fb is
given by
Fb(s) =
1−H(b) +H(s) s ≤ b,1 s > x,












where for the first equality we used that integration by dFb∗ is the pushforward of
Lebesgue integration under cFb∗ : (0, 1) → R+ (see, for instance, Theorem 1.104
in Klenke (2013)).
Hence, expected gain-loss utility in the money dimension from a bid b when
the reference point is given by bid b∗ is
























where we used that x is zero with probability 1 − H(b). Intuitively, the first
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summand is the loss from winning and paying unexpectedly, the second summand
is gain-loss utility from winning at a price different than expected, and the third
summand is the gain from losing unexpectedly and not paying. For total expected
utility we plug together the derived gain-loss utility in the money dimension



















In equilibrium the order statistic H is again endogenously determined by the
opponents’ equilibrium bids b(θ−i). Using the opponents’ response functions, it
is straightforward to calculate the symmetric equilibrium bidding function:
Proposition 5. The unique symmetric increasing continuously differentiable UPE
for n loss averse bidders in the Vickrey auction for commodities is given by
b(θ) =






















while for any θ > θmin
b(θ) >



















shows that high types overbid their intrinsic valuation. The intuition is that
low types don’t expect to win and try to avoid unexpected losses in the money
dimension. In contrast, high types expect to win and try to avoid unexpected
losses in the good dimension.
The English Auction
We avoid to fully classify the set of symmetric PE again, but rather straightfor-
wardly prove that the revenue ranking between the two auction formats remains
intact.15 The following Lemma parallels Lemma 4.
Lemma 7. Consider a loss-averse bidder of type θ in the continuous English
auction with one opponent. Let the opponent’s drop-out price be distributed ac-
cording to distribution F with nonzero density f on some positive support [a, b].
Then, any time consistent bidding strategy x ∈ (a, b) satisfies
x ≤ 1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θ.
Again, the bidders of high type ex ante like to commit to excessive bids,
but they know that the plan to bid above the threshold of 1+ηg
1+λmηm
θ is time-
inconsistent. Just one increment before they drop out, their belief to win and
pay is virtually zero and—similarly to the lowest type in the Vickrey auction—
they trade off the unexpected gain of the good against the unexpected loss in
money, which may both occur with very small probability. If loss aversion is
equally pronounced in both dimensions, then bidders underbid their intrinsic
value θ, since losses are weighted stronger than gains.
Revenue Comparison
15The full derivation of the symmetric equilibrium bidding functions is available on request.
27
Figure 6: G(θ) ∼ U [0, 1], η = 0.4, λ = 3
Since in the Vickrey auction we have
bVickrey(θ) ≥ 1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θ,
with equality only for θmin, and in the English auction we have
bEnglish(θ) ≤ 1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θ,
it is immediate that the Vickrey auction remains to dominate the English auc-
tion with respect to revenue. Figure 6 shows the gray shaded area of potential
equilibria in the English auctions, together with its PPE, and the equilibrium in
the Vickrey auction. If loss aversion is equally pronounced in both dimensions,
there is unambiguously underbidding in the English auction, while in the Vickrey
auction low types underbid and high types overbid.
7.2 False Beliefs or Heterogeneous Preferences
So far we have assumed that all participating bidders are loss averse and hold
rational beliefs over opponents’ behavior. This is not a crucial assumption. Loss-
averse bidders will bid higher in the Vickrey auction than in the English auction
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for any continuous belief with full support that they hold over opponents’ strate-
gies.
Following the analysis of Section 4, Equation 10 in the proof of Proposition 1




1 + η(1−H(b(θ))) + ληH(b(θ)))θ,
which shows that
b(θ) > (1 + η)θ
for all types, who win with positive probability. Contrary, in the English auction
Lemma 4 shows that for any such belief
b(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ.
7.3 Generalization to n bidders
In auctions where bidders face more than one opponent, the set of possible bidding
plans becomes very large. Recall that a bidding plan prescribes a consistent
action for any history and any future contingency at any time. While in the two
bidder case the history is rather simple—either the opponent dropped out and
the auction is over, or we are still in the auction process—with more bidders the
individual decision at each time may in principle depend on the exact timing at
which opponents dropped out in the past.
Since each decision must be sequentially optimal, given expectations about
the future, one might hope to be able to restrict to Markov perfect equilibria, in
the sense that at time t the individual type θi and the number of currently active
bidders is a sufficient statistic for the optimal decision of bidder i. However,
this is not the case. While the set of personal equilibria starting at time t can
be determined without looking into the past, the specific equilibrium path will
depend on the evolution of beliefs up to time t.
In order to deal with strategies contingent on histories, we introduce the
following notation:
Definition 4. For any n-bidder auction, define for all k ∈ {0, ..., n− 2}
Hk = {(t1, ..., tk)|0 ≤ t1 ≤, ...,≤ tk}
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as the set of histories / future contingencies with k drop outs at the respective
prices t1, ..., tk, with the convention H0 = {∅}.
With this notation, a complete bidding plan prescribes for each history and
future contingency the price at which a bidder of type θ plans to drop out:




Hk × [θmin, θmax]→ R+,
with the restriction that for any (t1, ..., tk, θ) we have
b(t1, ..., tk, θ) > tk,
The latter condition on the bidding function ensures that bidders cannot
condition their drop out on events that happen after the drop out.
Again, we restrict attention to differentiable and increasing equilibrium bid-
ding functions in the following sense:
Definition 6. A bidding strategy b in the English auction is differentiable and
increasing if for all (t1, ..., tk) ∈
⋃
0≤k≤n−2Hk the function b(t1, ..., tk, θ) is differ-
entiable and increasing in θ.
Example 2. Consider a continuous English auction with three loss-averse bid-
ders. A complete strategy prescribes for every θ:
• A price b(θ) for which a bidder drops out if no opponent dropped out before
• For any opponent drop out at some price t < b(θ), a price b(t, θ) at which
the bidder drops out in the subsequent two-bidder auction
The aim of the example is to illustrate why the optimal strategy b(t, θ) for the
two-bidder auction following the first drop out depends on t. Suppose that all
three bidders bid according to the same symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy
(b(θ), b(t, θ)). Let us focus on the decision problem of a bidder, whose valuation
θ is sufficiently high, such that b(θ) = (1 + η)θ were the only time-consistent
strategy in the two-bidder English auction.
Suppose first that an opponent has a valuation of zero and drops out at t = 0.
For the strategy b(0, θ) the bidder is now bound by the set of time-consistent
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strategies of the two-bidder auction, as outlined in Proposition 3. Since she has
high beliefs to win, the only time-consistent strategy is b(0, θ) = (1 + η)θ.
Next, we analyze optimal strategies b(t, θ) for t being smaller, but close to
b(θ). Similar to the two-bidder auction, a bidder with a high winning probability
would ex ante like to insure against belief fluctuations with an aggressive strategy.
Any strategy for b(t, θ), however, must be time consistent in the sense that the
bidder is willing to stick to it until t. Just before t the belief to win the auction
has decreased considerably. The bidder trades off the expected gains from trade
against the expected loss from news. The following Lemma states the expected
loss at time t for the three bidder case.
Lemma 8. Consider a continuous English auction with three loss-averse bid-
ders. Assume all bidders follow a symmetric, differentiable, increasing bidding
strategy (b(θ), b(t, θ)). Assume further that no bidder dropped out until t ∈
[b(θmin), b(θmax)]. Let θ(t) be defined by b(θ) = t. Then expected gain-loss utility

























The terms of Lt(θ) are easy to interpret. At time t the conditional marginal
probability that the first drop out is of type s is given by 2g(s)(1−G(s))
(1−G(θ(t)))2 . In this case,







(term A). Further, term B shows the expected loss for the following 2-bidder
auction, as calculated in Proposition 2.
Term A indicates an additional source of expected gain-loss disutility, com-
pared to the two bidder auction: even if a bidder loses after all, beliefs to win
don’t necessarily gradually decline to zero, but might temporarily increase due to
one opponent dropping out. This effect leads to more belief fluctuations and wors-
ens bidder’s trade-off between expected news disutility and expected gains from
trade. As a result, it is no longer time consistent to bid up to b(t, θ) = (1 + η)θ
for all t.
Corollary 3. In any symmetric, increasing, differentiable equilibrium (b(θ), b(t, θ))
of the English auction with three loss-averse bidders, expected news disutility for
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If b(t, θ) is continuous in t, then—by time-consistency—
lim
t→b(θ)
b(t, θ) ≤ (1 + η − Λ)θ.
Since we have argued above that b(0, θ) = (1 + η)θ, the corollary illustrates
that bidding behavior b(t, θ) in general depends on opponents’ drop-out history
t.
Even if the sales price depends on all type realizations, it is immediate that
for n bidders the revenue ranking between the two auction format remains: since
bidders generically don’t share the same valuation, in any symmetric continuous
increasing equilibrium they will drop out of the auction consecutively, in order of
their types. Eventually, with probability one, the two bidders with the highest
valuation will end up in the two-bidder subgame. Here they are bound to the
constraints on time-consistent behavior, as analyzed in section 5. In particular
by Lemma 4, any time-consistent strategy for the two-bidder auction satisfies
b(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ.
To summarize:
Corollary 4. In a symmetric increasing equilibrium of the continuous English
auction with n loss-averse bidders, the revenue may depend on all type realiza-
tions. For any opponent drop-out history, every bidder’s maximal bid is bounded
by b(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ. Thus, with n loss-averse bidders, the English auction remains
to yield lower revenues than the Vickrey auction.
Even if the auction outcome for many bidders is similar to the one for two
bidders, it is worth noting that individual bidders obtain less utility, compared to
two-bidder auctions with the same sales price. To see this, consider—hypothetically—
that bidders could choose not to observe individual drop outs, but rather learn in
each period, whether any opponent is still in the game. The auction would then
subjectively resemble an English auction with two bidders, where the opponent’s
type is drawn from the first order-statistic over all opponents. The key difference
is that information is fluctuating much less. As already mentioned earlier and
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stated in generality in Proposition 1 of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), the collapse of
multiple signals into one will always weakly decrease gain-loss disutility.
8 Conclusion
I studied the effects of expectation-based preferences in dynamic environments
with strategic interaction, comparing the dynamic English auction to the static
Vickrey auction. If the reference point is static and doesn’t respond to the arrival
of new information, there is no strategic difference between the English auction
and the Vickrey auction. If bidders update their reference point instantaneously
with respect to new information, however, dynamic information in the English
influences the bidders’ endogenous preferences, and thus their bidding strategies.
The classical strategic equivalence between the the two auction formats breaks
down and the English auction attains strictly lower revenue than the Vickrey
auction.
This difference highlights the importance of understanding the evolution of
the reference point in dynamic environments. In particular, research about the
speed of reference point adaptation with respect to new information is still in its
infancy and deserves further study.
The non-equivalence of the two auction formats stands in sharp contrast to the
revenue equivalence principles by Vickrey (1961) and Myerson (1981). Indeed,
the powerful approach of mechanism design and the revelation principle relies
on the assumption that agents’ valuations are exogenously given and do not
depend on the choice of mechanism. This assumption is violated if bidders have
endogenous preferences that depend on expectations induced by the mechanism
itself. In particular, if agents update their reference point with respect to new
information in a multi-stage mechanism, such a mechanism cannot be replaced
by a simple direct mechanism without changing agents’ incentives. The failure
of the revelation principle naturally leads to the question of optimal mechanism
design in dynamic environments with expectation-based loss-averse agents. The
study of optimal expectation management in these environments is an interesting
question left for future research.
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9 Appendix
Equivalence of the UPE and the PE for a Single Decision
under Uncertainty
This paragraph formally derives how the concept of a personal equilibrium (PE)
in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) for our special case of a single decision under uncer-
tainty coincides with the concept of an unacclimated personal equilibrium (UPE)
for static decision problems in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007).
Since utility is additively separable across different commodity dimensions,
it suffices to consider one dimension. For the framework of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2009) suppose that a person in period 0 chooses an action from some choice
set D. The action is characterized by its distribution G of payoffs in period 1.
The distribution G determines the reference point for the payoffs. Utility from a





Choosing some action with distribution F when the reference point is G therefore











By definition in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) an action with distribution G is a
personal equilibrium if it maximizes expected utility, given its induced beliefs,
i.e. if U(G|G) ≥ U(F |G) for all F ∈ D. Similarly, by Equation (2) in Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2007) expected utility of a payoff distribution F when the reference


















such that the definitions of U(F |G) in equation (8) and (9) coincide. For contin-
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uously increasing distributions G this is a consequence of integration by substitu-
tion. For general distributions it follows from the fact that integration
∫ · dG(x)
is the pushforward measure of the Lebesgue measure under cG : (0, 1) → R
(c.f. Theorem 1.104 in Klenke (2013)).
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that all opponents bid according to some in-
creasing, continuously differentiable bidding function b(θ). Since G(θ) is a distri-
bution with strictly positive, continuous density g, it follows that the distribution
of the maximal opponent bid, H(x) = Gn−1(b−1(x)), is a differentiable distribu-
tion with positive, continuous density h(x) on [b(θmin), b(θmax)] as well.
The bidding function b(θ) constitutes a PE if and only if the utility function
U0(x, θ|b(θ)) attains its maximum at x = b(θ) for all θ. Differentiation with
respect to x yields
∂U0(x, θ|b(θ))
∂x
=h(x)(1−H(b(θ)))µ(θ)− h(x)H(b(θ))µ(−θ) + (θ − x)h(x).
By dividing by h(x) and evaluating at x = b(θ) we obtain the first-order condition




1 + η(1−H(b(θ))) + ληH(b(θ)))θ. (10)
Using that H(b(θ)) = Gn−1(θ) we obtain
b(θ) =
(
1 + η(1−Gn−1(θ)) + ληGn−1(θ))θ






(1 + η(1−Gn−1(θ)) + ληGn−1(θ)) + Λ(n− 1)Gn−2(θ)g(θ)θ
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= −h(b(θ)) + h′(b(θ)) [θ − b(θ) + (1−H(b(θ)))µ(θ)−H(b(θ))µ(−θ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose first that F1 and F2 are invertible on [a, b]. By the
theorem of the integral over inverse functions (e.g. Theorem 1 in Key (1994)),
any invertible distribution F on [a, b] satisfies∫ b
a
F (x)dx = bF (b)− aF (a)−
∫ 1
0


















F1(x) F1(x) > F2(x),F2(x) F1(x) ≤ F2(x),
and similarly
F−1 (x) =
F1(x) F1(x) ≤ F2(x),F2(x) F1(x) > F2(x).
By construction, F+1 and F
−
1 are invertible and satisfy F
+
1 (x) ≥ F2(x) ≥ F−1 (x)
for all x ∈ [a, b], and moreover
cF+1 (p) =
cF1(p) F1(cF1(p)) > F2(cF1(p)),cF2(p) F1(cF1(p)) ≤ F2(cF1(p)),
and
cF−1 (p) =
cF1(p) F1(cF1(p)) ≤ F2(cF1(p)),cF2(p) F1(cF1(p)) > F2(cF1(p)),
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µ(cF2(p)− cF1(p))1F1(cF1 (p))>F2(cF1 (p))dp+
∫ 1
0





which proves the lemma for invertible distributions. We now show the lemma
for general distribution functions, when the quantile functions cFi are defined as
usual by
cFi(p) = inf{x ∈ R|p ≤ F (x)}.
Take two arbitrary sequences of continuously increasing distribution functions
(F1,n), (F2,n) which converge pointwise Fi,n → Fi everywhere outside the null-set
of discontinuity points of Fi for i = 1, 2.
16 By Theorem 1.1.1 in De Haan and
Ferreira (2007), limn→∞ Fi,n(x) = Fi(x) for all continuity points of Fi implies
limn→∞ cFi,n(p) = cFi(p) for all continuity points of cFi(p). Using Lebesgue’s
dominated convergence theorem and that the set of discontinuity points is a null-




























16To see existence of such a sequence, take a positive sequence εn → 0 and define
Fi,n = (1− εn)Gi,n + εn x−ab−a , where Gi,n is the continuous function which is linear on εn-balls
around any discontinuity point of Fi and coincides with Fi elsewhere.
37
which concludes the proof for arbitrary distributions.
Proof of Lemma 2. By applying Lemma 1, and using the fact that µ is piecewise
linear, we can write







































µ(F (x)− F1(x))dx+ ∆
∫ b
a
µ(−F (x) + F1(x))dx








Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose the current clock price is t and the opponent
hasn’t dropped out yet. If the clock increases in increments of ε, then the con-
ditional probability that the opponent drops out at the next increment is given
by
∆t :=
F (t+ ε)− F (t)
1− F (t) .
Given her strategy b and that the opponent hasn’t dropped out at t, the bidder
faces the conditional probability of 1−F (b)
1−F (t) to lose the auction. Thus, if F
b
t denotes
the belief about payoffs in the good dimension at time t given strategy b, we have
F bt (z) =

1−F (b)
1−F (t) z < θ,
1 z ≥ θ.
38
If the bidder wins in the next increment, the belief will update to
F bt+ε(z) =
0 z < θ,1 z ≥ θ.
According to Lemma 2, expected gain-loss utility of the increment from t to t+ ε
is then given by
E(N(F bt+ε|F bt )) = −∆tΛ
∫
|F bt (z)− F bt+ε(z)|dz = −∆tΛ
1− F (b)
1− F (t)θ.
Now, the marginal loss at time t if ε goes to zero reads






(1− F (t))2 (1− F (b))Λθ.
To calculate total expected gain-loss utility starting at time t, note that any
information update at time s > t is only informative and carries gain-loss utility
if the opponent hasn’t already dropped out between t and s, which holds true
with the conditional probability 1−F (s)
1−F (t) . Thus













−1− F (t+ iε)
1− F (t) ∆t+iεΛ
1− F (b)



















Proof of Lemma 3. At time t the winning probability is given by the probability
that the opponent drops out between t and b∗, given she didn’t drop out before
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t, thus F (b
∗)−F (t)
1−F (t) . The update changes the probability of getting θ by
F (b)− F (t)
1− F (t) −
F (b∗)− F (t)
1− F (t) =
F (b)− F (b∗)
1− F (t) .
Hence,
N(F bt |F b
∗
t ) = µ
(
F (b)− F (b∗)
1− F (t) θ
)
=
µ(F (b)− F (b∗))
1− F (t) θ.
Proof of Lemma 4. The bidder does not want do deviate to a lower strategy y at
any time t, given plan b if and only if
Ut(y, θ, F |b) ≤ Ut(b, θ, F |b)
for all t ≤ y ≤ b. In particular it is necessary that for all t < b the derivative
from the left satisfies
0 ≤ lim
y↗b


































1− F (b) (θ − b+ ληθ − Λθ) .
Since, by assumption, f(b) > 0, this means that necessarily
b ≤ (1 + λη − Λ)θ = (1 + η)θ.
Proof of Lemma 5. Given opponent’s strategy F and bidder’s type θ, a bid b(θ)
is a personal equilibrium in the auction with commitment if and only if
U0(y, θ, F |b(θ)) ≤ U0(b(θ), θ, F |b(θ))
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for all y. In particular, it is necessary that
lim
y↘b(θ)
∂U0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
≤ 0.
By Equation (7) the utility for y > b(θ) at time zero reads
U0(y, θ, F |b(θ)) =
∫ y
0
(θ−s)dF (s)+η(F (y)−F (b(θ)))θ+ln(1−F (y))(1−F (y))Λθ.
Hence, the necessary condition is equivalent to
f(b(θ))
(
θ − b(θ) + ηθ − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ))))θ) ≤ 0.
In any symmetric equilibrium, the opponent bids according to b(θ) as well, and
therefore we have F (b(θ)) = G(θ). From g(θ) = f(b(θ))b′(θ) and the restriction
that b is increasing it follows that f(b(θ)) > 0. Hence we have
b(θ) ≥ (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ
for any equilibrium candidate. It remains to verify that
b(θ) =
(
1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ (11)
is a personal equilibrium, given opponent’s response b(θ). For this it is sufficient
to show that
∂U0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
≤ 0
for all y > b(θ), and
∂U0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
≥ 0
for all y < b(θ). Note that we can without loss of generality restrict to y ∈ [b(θmin), b(θmax)].
For any such y there exists some θ˜ with y = b(θ˜), since the bidding function
is continuous.
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Consider first y > b(θ), thus θ˜ > θ. Then




θ − b(θ˜) + ηθ − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜))))θ)
< f(b(θ˜))
(
θ˜ − b(θ˜) + ηθ˜ − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜))))θ˜)
= lim
y↘b(θ˜)
∂U0(y, θ˜, F |b(θ˜))
∂y
= 0,
where the last equality is due to equality in (11). Similarly, for y < b(θ), thus
θ˜ < θ we have




θ − b(θ˜) + ληθ − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜))))θ)
> f(b(θ˜))
(
θ˜ − b(θ˜) + ηθ˜ − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜))))θ˜)
= lim
y↘b(θ˜)
∂U0(y, θ˜, F |b(θ˜))
∂y
= 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider a bidding strategy b∗.
Claim 1: If and only if b∗ ≤ (1 + η)θ, it is at no time t < b∗ profitable to
deviate to a lower strategy b ∈ [t, b∗).
Proof: the “only if” has been proved in Lemma 4. For the “if”, assume that
b∗ ≤ (1 + η)θ. Consider a deviation at some time t < b∗ from b∗ to b ∈ [t, b∗). We
first look at the change in expected gain-loss disutility: term A can be interpreted
as the change due to different expectations at each time between t and b, while
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term B is forgone gain-loss disutility, since the auction necessarily ends at b:
























































F (b∗)− F (b)























(1− F (b∗))(1− F (t))
=Λθ
F (b∗)− F (b)
1− F (t) .
Now we have








(θ − s)dF (s) + µ(F (b)− F (b∗))θ + Λθ(F (b∗)− F (b))
)
<
F (b∗)− F (b)
1− F (t) (−θ + b
∗ − ληθ + Λθ)
=
F (b∗)− F (b)
1− F (t) (−(1 + η)θ + b
∗)
≤0.
Thus, there is no profitable deviation to b < b∗ at any time, which concludes the
proof of Claim 1.
Claim 1 directly shows the necessity of 1. for any PE. Certainly, 2. is necessary
as well.
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Claim 2: If it is not profitable to deviate to a strategy b > b∗ at time t = 0,
then it is not profitable at any time t ≤ b∗.
Proof: It is not profitable to deviate to a strategy b > b∗ at time t if and only if
0 ≥ Ut(b, θ, F |b∗)− Ut(b∗, θ, F |b∗)
Now,
















− 1− F (b
∗)










(θ − s)dF (s) + µ(F (b)− F (b∗))θ ...
...+ Λθ((1− F (b)) ln(1− F (b))− (1− F (b∗)) ln(1− F (b∗)) + (F (b)− F (b∗)) ln(1− F (t)))
)
.
Note that the expression in the big brackets is decreasing in t. Thus, if it is
negative for t = 0, then it is as well negative for all t > 0. Hence, if
0 ≥ U0(b, θ, F |b∗)− U0(b∗, θ, F |b∗)
then
0 ≥ Ut(b, θ, F |b∗)− Ut(b∗, θ, F |b∗)
for all t > 0, which concludes the proof of Claim 2.
Now we are ready to show sufficiency: assume 1. and 2. hold. Then by Claim
1 it can’t be profitable to deviate to a lower strategy at any time. To show that
there is no profitable deviation to a higher strategy, take any time-consistent
strategy b ≥ b∗. By Claim 1 this necessarily means b ∈ [b∗, (1 + η)θ]. From 2.
it follows that U0(b
∗, θ, F |b∗) ≥ U0(b, θ, F |b∗). Then, by Claim 2, the agent does
not want to deviate to a higher strategy at any time, and b∗ is indeed a PE.
Proof of Proposition 3. Take some increasing equilibrium function. By Lemma
6, it satisfies b(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ for all θ ∈ (θmin, θmax). If b(θ) < (1 +η)θ for some θ,
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then—again by Lemma 6—any y ∈ [b(θ), (1 + η)θ] satisfies U0(b(θ), θ, F |b(θ)) ≥
U0(y, θ, F |x). This means that
lim
y↘b(θ)
∂U0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
≤ 0,
which—as we have seen in the proof of Lemma 5—straightforwardly solves to
b(θ) ≥ (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ
in equilibrium. This shows that any increasing equilibrium satisfies 1. and 2.
for all θ ∈ (θmin, θmax). By continuity it also holds for all θ ∈ [θmin, θmax].
Conversely, assume that b(θ) satisfies 1. and 2. By Lemma 6 it only remains to
show that for any
y ∈ [b(θ), (1 + η)θ]
we have
U0(b(θ), θ, F |b(θ)) ≥ U0(y, θ, F |b(θ)).
This condition is trivially satisfied for any θ with b(θ) = (1 + η)θ. Consider
therefore θ with b(θ) < (1 + η)θ. It suffices to show that
∂U0(y, θ, F |b(θ))
∂y
≤ 0
for all y ∈ [b(θ), (1 + η)θ]. Let y˜ be any of such y. Since
b(θmax) = (1 + η)θmax > (1 + η)θ ≥ y˜ ≥ b(θ),
and b is continuous, there exists some θ˜ ≥ θ with b(θ˜) = y˜. Since
(1 + η)θ > (1 + η)θ ≥ y˜ = b(θ˜), we know by 2. that
b(θ) ≥ (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ.
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Now,




= [(1 + η)θ − y˜ − Λθ(1 + ln(1− F (y˜)))]f(y˜)
= [(1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1− F (b(θ˜)))))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
θ − b(θ˜)]f(b(θ˜))




Proof of Corollary 2. We have
(
1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ ≤ (1 + η)θ
if and only if −(1 + ln(1 − G(θ))) ≤ 0, which is equivalent to G(θ) ≤ 1 − 1/e.
Therefore, by Proposition 3, a fuction b(θ) is a symmetric equilibrium if and only
if
• b(θ) ∈ [(1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ, (1 + η)θ] for G(θ) ≤ 1− 1/e, and
• b(θ) = (1 + η)θ for G(θ) > 1− 1/e.
We determine the utility maximizing equilibrium on the interval whereG(θ) ≤ 1− 1/e.
Bidder’s expected utility of a bid b is
U0(b, θ, F |b) =
∫ b
0




(θ − s)dF (s) + Λθ ln(1− F (b))(1− F (b)).
Thus, for any b ≥ (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ
∂U0(b, θ, F |b)
∂b
= (θ − b)f(b)− Λθ(1 + ln(1− F (b)))f(b)
≤ (θ − (1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θ))))θ)f(b)− Λθf(b)




This shows that the lowest b among all equilibrium strategies yields the highest
utility.
Finally, since for the PPE
b(θmin) =
(
1 + η − Λ(1 + ln(1−G(θmin))))θmin = (1 + η − Λ)θmin,
there is underbidding for low types in the PPE if and only if
0 > η − Λ = 2η − λη,
hence if and only if λ > 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. If bidders do not update their reference point during the





N(F kT (b, θ)|F k0 (b∗, θ,H0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain-loss utility
+1b>x(θ − x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
classical utility
,
as in the Vickrey auction. Since for a two-bidder English auction the set of
bidding strategies is the same as in a Vickrey auction, this concludes the proof
of the first claim for the two-bidder case.
For completeness, we also show the claim for n bidders. With multiple oppo-
nents in the English auction, a bidder can use history-dependent bidding strate-
gies for both, the equilibrium bidding plan and any deviation. Such strategies
may induce price distributions that are unavailable in the Vickrey auction.
Since the prior distribution of types and opponents’ bidding strategies are
continuous, the distribution H of the maximal opponent bid, given the bidder is
still in the auction at that price, is continuous as well. Hence, by the intermediate
value theorem there exists a bid b such that (history-independently) bidding up
to b induces the same winning probability as b, and therefore the same utility in
the good dimension.17 In the following we show formally that, irrespective of the
reference point, strategy b dominates strategy b as it induces lower payments.
For bidding strategy b the bidder wins with probability one, whenever the
maximal opponent bid is below b. For bidding strategy b denote with pb(x) the
induced probability of winning at price x conditional on the maximal opponent
bid being x. Hence, for Fmb denoting the distribution of monetary transfers to
17If H were discontinuous we could obtain the same result by randomization at b.
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pay by the bidder if she bids according to b, we obtain










Thus, Fmb weakly dominates F
m
b
in the first order sense, strictly so if the outcome
of b differs to b on more than a Null set. Since the integrand in the definition of
expected utility in the money dimension







is strictly decreasing in x, first order stochastic dominance implies that
















= Um0 (b, θ|b∗)
for all b∗ and all b that differ to b on more than a Null set. This implies in
particular that any history-dependent strategy b∗ which differs to the history-
independent strategy b
∗
on more than a Null set cannot be a personal equilibrium
in the English auction, since
U0(b
∗
, θ|b∗) > U0(b∗, θ|b∗).
Moreover, for any strategy to bid up to b∗ ∈ R+ we have U0(b, θ|b∗) ≤ U0(b∗, θ|b∗)
for all b if and only if U0(b, θ|b∗) ≤ U0(b∗, θ|b∗) for all history-independent strate-
gies b, which concludes that a strategy is an equilibrium in the English auction
if and only if it is an equilibrium in the Vickrey auction.
For (2) note that by Proposition 1 the equilibrium bidding function for the
Vickrey auction is given by
bVickrey(θ) = (1 + η + ΛG
n−1(θ))θ,
whereas any equilibrium bidding function in the English auction with instanta-
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neous reference point updating by Lemma 6 satisfies
bEnglish(θ) ≤ (1 + η)θ.
Since, by assumption, Gn−1(θ) is strictly increasing, we have Gn−1(θ) > 0 for all
θ > θmin, and the claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 5. The structure of the proof is similar to the one of Propo-
sition 3 in Lange and Ratan (2010). Suppose that all opponents bid according
to some increasing, continuously differentiable bidding function b(θ). Since G(θ)
is a distribution with strictly positive, continuous density g, the distribution of
the maximal opponent bid H(x) = Gn−1(b−1(x)) is a differentiable distribution
with positive, continuous density h(x) on [b(θmin), b(θmax)] as well. The bidding
function b(θ) constitutes a PE if and only if U0(y, θ|b(θ)) attains a maximum at
y = b(θ) for all θ. Differentiation of the utility function with respect to y yields
∂U0(y, θ|b(θ))
∂y









By dividing by h(y) and evaluating at y = b(θ), we obtain the first-order condition

















0 = (1 + ηg)θ − (1 + λmηm)b(θ) + Λm
∫ b(θ)
0
sdH(s) + ΛgH(b(θ))θ. (12)
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Using that H(b(θ)) = Gn−1(θ) we can rewrite this equation to




Differentiation with respect to θ yields







1 + ηg + Λg(θG
n−1(θ))′
1 + λmηm
































To determine C, we insert θmin into equation (12) and obtain that






which shows that C = 0. Now we can use integration by parts in order to rewrite
the solution into
b(θ) =
















Since G(x) = 0 for all x ≤ θmin, we finally have
b(θ) =





















































Proof of Lemma 7. Assume the clock increases in increments of ε and the bidder
plans to bid up to x ∈ (a, b). Assume the clock price is x− ε, and the opponent
has not dropped out yet. We analyze bidders incentives to bid at x given her
plan to do so.
Let ∆ = ∆(ε) = F (x)−F (x−ε)
1−F (x−ε) be the probability that the opponent drops out
at x, given she is still in at x−ε. This means the bidder beliefs to win the auction
and get a payoff of (θ,−(x− ε)) with probability ∆. If the bidder bids at x she
receives a utility of
U0(x, θ, F |x) = ∆(θ − (x− ε))︸ ︷︷ ︸
classical utility
+∆ (1−∆)(ηgθ − λmηm(x− ε))︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain-loss of winning the auction
+ (1−∆) ∆(−λgηgθ + ηm(x− ε)).︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain-loss of losing the auction
If she drops out before bidding x, she receives
U0(x− ε, θ, F |x) = ∆(−λgηgθ + ηm(x− ε))︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain-loss of losing the auction
.
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If bidding up to x is time consistent, then
U0(x, θ, F |x) ≥ u(x− ε, θ, F |x).
This is equivalent to
∆[θ − (x− ε) + (1−∆)(ηgθ − λmηm(x− ε))−∆(−λgηgθ + ηm(x− ε))] ≥ 0.
Since F has a positive density, we have ∆ > 0, and it follows
(1 + ηg)θ − (1 + λmηm)(x− ε) + ∆(Λgθ + Λm(x− ε)) ≥ 0.
Since F has no atoms, limε→0 ∆(ε) = 0. Thus, in the limit as the increment size
goes to zero, we obtain
(1 + ηg)θ − (1 + λmηm)x ≥ 0,
or equivalently
x ≤ 1 + ηg
1 + λmηm
θ.
Proof of Lemma 8. From the perspective of a representative bidder, we denote
with F (x) the distribution of prices, at which a particular opponent drops out,
i.e. F (b(θ)) = G(θ). Similarly we denote with Ft(x) the distribution of drop-out
prices of the remaining opponent, given the other opponent drops out at t. Since
the remaining opponent j didn’t drop out until t, her type θj necessarily satisfies
θj > θ(t), and therefore
Ft(b(t, θ)) = Prob(θj ≤ θ|θj > θ(t)) = G(θ)−G(θ(t))
1−G(θ(t)) .
If we denote with L2,t expected gain-loss utility in the two-bidder subgame fol-
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For the 3-bidder auction leading to the first drop out, consider first price incre-
ments of ε. Suppose the clock is at price s and both opponents are still remaining.
Since we restrict to symmetric increasing bidding functions, a bidder of type θ
wins the auction if and only if both opponents have a type lower that θ. Given






The probability that a particular opponent j drops out at the next increment
is
∆(s) =
F (s+ ε)− F (s)
1− F (s) .
At the next increment s+ ε there are three possibilities:
• With probability (∆(s))2 both opponents drop out. The bidder wins with








• With probability 2∆(s)(1−∆(s)) exactly one opponent drops out. The bid-


















Since F is continuous, ∆(s) approaches zero, as the increment size goes to zero.
Therefore, in the limit for the continuous English auction, the probability that
both opponents drop out at the same time is of second order and has no impact
on expected gain-loss utility. Applying Lemma 2, expected gain-loss utility in the











As the increment size goes to zero, in the limit the marginal expected gain-loss


















. Consequently the marginal probability of a drop out at









(1− F (t))2 .








































































































































Now, since b(t, θ) is continuous in t, limt→b(θ) b(t, θ) exists. We prove the threshold
of time-consistent behavior for (θmin, θmax) by contradiction. For the boundaries
it follows by continuity. Assume that there is some θ ∈ (θmin, θmax) with
lim
t→b(θ)
b(t, θ) > (1 + η − Λ)θ.
Since b(t, θ) is continuous there is some tˆ < b(θ) and θˆ ∈ [θ(tˆ), θ], such that
b(t, θ) > (1 + η − Λ)θ
for all t ∈ [tˆ, b(θ)], θ ∈ [θˆ, θ]. This implies that the sales price for the good
exceeds (1 + η − Λ)θ if no bidder drops out until tˆ. If b(t, θ) is a time-consistent
strategy, then at time tˆ a bidder of type θ must weakly prefer this strategy to an

















(θ − (1 + η − Λ)θ) + Ltˆ(θ),
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a contradiction for tˆ sufficiently close to b(θ).
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